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Abstract 
 
Motivated by sustainable development challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study assesses 
the comparative persistence of environmental unsustainability in a sample of 44 countries in the 
sub-region for the period  2000 to 2012. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised 
Method of Moments. Of the six hypotheses tested, it is not feasible to assess the hypothesis on 
resource-wealth because of issues in degrees of freedom. As for the remaining hypotheses, the 
following findings are established. (i) Hypothesis 1 postulating that middle income countries 
have a lower level of persistence in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions is valid for CO2 per capita 
emissions, CO2 emissions from electricity and heat production and CO2 emissions from liquid 
fuel consumption. (ii) Hypothesis 2 on the edge of French civil law countries is valid for CO2 
emissions from liquid fuel consumption and CO2 intensity, but not for CO2 per capita 
emissions. (iii) Hypothesis 3 on the postulation that politically-unstable countries reflect more 
persistence is valid for CO2 per capita emissions. (iv) Hypothesis 5 on the propensity for 
landlocked countries to be associated with more persistence in CO2 emissions is valid for CO2 
per capita emissions but not for CO2 emissions from liquid fuel consumption. (v) Hypothesis 6 
maintaining that Christianity-dominated countries are more environmentally friendly with 
regard to CO2 emissions is valid for CO2 per capita emissions but not for  CO2 emissions from 
liquid fuel consumption  and CO2 intensity. Implications for policy and theory are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 Two main factors motivate this study, namely: (i) growing challenges of climate change 
and emissions of green house gases and (ii) gaps in the literature. These points are substantiated 
in chronological order. First, environmental sustainability has become a key policy agenda in 
the post-2015 development era (Asongu et al., 2016a). The particularity of sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) within this framework can be substantiated with four main points, namely: the sub-
region’s comparatively impressive recent growth record; growing energy crisis; the sub-
region’s poor management of energy crises and consequences of climate change. We 
substantiate the highlighted points in chronological order. 
 (i) Over the past two decades, SSA has experienced a period of growth resurgence (see 
Fosu, 2015), after lost decades that were the result, in part to the ineffective Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP). Moreover, some narratives posit that the sub-region has 
recently hosted seven of the ten fastest growing economies in the world (see Asongu & 
Rangan, 2016). (ii) In the post-2015 sustainable development era, energy crisis is one of the 
most challenging policy syndromes in the sub-region1. The need for energy is most apparent in 
SSA because: only 5% of the population have access to energy in the sub-region; the total 
energy consumed in SSA is about the same as that consumed by a single state such as New 
York in the United States of America (USA) and the consumption of energy in the sub region is 
below 17% of the global average (see Shurig, 2015). (iii) As recently documented by 
Anyangwe (2014) and Asongu et al. (2017), inefficiency has been a dominant characteristic in 
the management of energy in most African countries. As a case in point, Nigeria which is the 
most populated country resorts to petroleum subsidized fossil fuel as a means of addressing 
concerns related to electricity outage and shortage. Accordingly, a sustainable development 
policy should instead place more emphasis on renewable sources of energy as opposed to 
government-subsidized petroleum fuel2. (iv) The consumption of fossil fuels has a direct 
consequence on global warming (Huxster et al., 2015), largely because the emissions of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) associated with the consumption of such fuels, account for about seventy-five 
percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. According to Kifle (2008), Africa is the continent 
projected to be associated with the most negative consequences of global warming.  
                                                 
1
 Fosu (2013) defines policy syndromes as situations that are detrimental to growth: ‘administered redistribution’, 
‘state breakdown’, ‘state controls’, and ‘suboptimal inter temporal resource allocation’. Within the framework of 
this study, policy syndromes are considered as issues that merit policy action in order to achieve environmental 
sustainable development. 
2
 The definition of sustainable development is consistent with that provided by the Brundtland Commission: ‘. . . 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs’ (Brundtland Commission, 1987). This definition is related to the context of this study because 
environmental unsustainability by means of CO2 emissions can compromise the needs of future generations.  
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 Second, to the best of our knowledge, in spite of the abundant supply of literature 
(notably on connections between energy consumption, CO2 emissions and economic growth), 
we know very little about the persistence of  CO2 emissions, especially in countries projected to 
be the most affected by global warming. Accordingly, the positioning of this study deviates 
from mainstream literature which has largely articulated connections between energy 
consumption, CO2 emissions and economic growth. This mainstream literature has been 
established in two main strands. The first provides insights into the relationships between the 
pollution of the environment and economic prosperity, with particular emphasis on the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) assumption (see Akbostanci et al., 2009; Diao et al., 
2009; He & Richard, 2010)3.  The second strand has been concerned with: (i) linkages between 
environmental pollution, energy consumption and economic growth (Jumbe, 2004; Ang, 2007; 
Apergis & Payne, 2009; Odhiambo, 2009a, 2009b; Ozturk & Acaravci, 2010; Menyah & 
Wolde-Rufael, 2010; Begum et al., 2015; Bölük & Mehmet, 2015) and the relationship 
between economic prosperity and the consumption of energy (Mehrara, 2007; Esso, 2010 ).  
A common denominator in the highlighted studies is the failure to engage the concept of 
persistence in environmental pollution. Moreover, the estimated techniques (such Granger 
Causality, Vector Error Correction Models and Autoregressive Distributed Lag) employed by 
the highlighted studies fall short of critically engaging the lagged dependent variable. In 
essence, models employing the lagged dependent variable may not be consistently estimated 
given that by construction the error term is correlated with the lagged outcome indicator via 
fixed effects.  We address above shortcomings by focusing on CO2 persistence and employing 
a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach which thoroughly addresses 
the concern of the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term.  
In order to increase the policy relevance of this study, the dataset is decomposed into 
fundamental characteristics of environmental degradation based on income levels (low income 
versus (vs.) middle income countries); legal origins (English Common law vs. French Civil law 
countries); religious domination (Christianity- vs. Islam-dominated countries); openness to sea 
(landlocked vs. coastal countries); resource-wealth (oil-rich vs. oil-poor countries) and political 
stability (stable vs. unstable countries). Motivations for the choice of fundamental features are 
critically engaged in Section 2.  
In the light of the underlying theoretical insights, this study examines the persistence of 
environmental unsustainability. The concept of persistence in the study should be understood as 
                                                 
3
 According to the EKC hypothesis, in the long term, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita 
income and environmental degradation. 
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the connection between how past observations in environmental unsustainability influence 
future observations in environmental unsustainability. From an empirical standpoint, a 
hypothesis on persistence can be examined using a dynamic estimation technique. An example 
of such an estimation strategy is the Generalized Method of Moments that has been employed 
in recent literature to investigate persistence in economic phenomena (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2018; Asongu et al., 2018a).  
The positioning of this study depart from recent environmental sustainability literature 
which has focused on inter alia: sustainable economic planning (Radovanovic & Lior, 2017); 
the role of normative beliefs on environmental behaviour (Wang & Lin, 2017); nexuses 
between conflict, development and environmental sustainability (Fisher & Rucki, 2017) and the 
promotion of work place environmental sustainability (Saifulina &  Carballo-Penela, 2017).  
The rest of the study is structured as follows. The theoretical underpinnings and 
motivations for fundamental characteristics are discussed in Section 2 while Section 3 engages 
the data and methodology. The empirical results are presented in Section 4 whereas Section 5 
concludes with implications and future research directions. 
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings and motivations for fundamental characteristics  
The theoretical underpinnings for persistence in CO2 emissions (e.g. per capita CO2 emissions) 
is consistent with recent literature on persistence in inclusive development (see Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017a). The theoretical background is in accordance with the literature on per 
capita income convergence which has been considerably established within the framework of 
neoclassical growth estimations (see  Barro, 1991; Barro  &  Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995;  
Mankiw et al., 1992;  Baumol, 1986) and recently extended to other fields of economic 
development, inter alia: financial market performance (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 
2012) and inclusive human development (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Asongu  & Nwachukwu, 
2017a)4.  
 In the post-Kenynesian period, seminal growth theories which gained prominence with 
the birth of the neoclassical revolution have eased convergence across countries. Under this 
                                                 
4
 It is important to note that the connection between inclusive development and CO2 emissions should be seen  in 
the light of the fact that the theoretical underpinnings of income convergence are being extended to other 
development fields. Accordingly, if such underpinnings have been employed for inclusive development and other 
macroeconomic variables, they can also be extended to environmental degradation by means of CO2 emissions. 
Moreover, the fundamental characteristics in the concept of inclusive development (used by Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017b) are much related to the concept of sustainable development (used in this paper) from a 
conceptual point of view. In essence, such concepts are connected in the perspective that in order for inclusive 
development to be sustainable, it must be sustained and in order to sustained development to be sustainable, it 
should be inclusive (see Amavilah et al., 2017).  
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framework, concepts for market equilibrium have been broadened to articulate some 
background for theories of economic growth that predict absolute convergence. Within this 
context, cross-country catch-up is the outcome of policies that are conducive to ‘free-market 
competition’ (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010).  Seminal studies on catch-up concluded on the absence of 
convergence (see Barro, 1991; Pritchett, 1997). Reasons for the absence of convergence 
include: differences in initial endowments and the presence of multiple equilibria. Conversely, 
a contending strand which articulates the exogenous growth theory argues that regardless of 
initial endowments, convergence is feasible in each country’s common steady state or long run 
equilibrium.   
In the light of the above, the theoretical and empirical underpinnings employed by both 
schools of thought to establish their positions (on evidence or not of convergence) are what 
matter to us for this study. In other words, both proponents for and against the presence of 
convergence have largely based their conclusions using the same theoretical and empirical 
frameworks. Therefore, we aim within the context of this inquiry to employ the same 
theoretical and empirical underpinnings to assess the persistence of CO2 emissions. Our results, 
depending on fundamental characteristics and sub-panels may consolidate the positions of 
either school of the thought.    
 We discuss the testable hypotheses for comparative CO2 emissions in terms of income 
levels, legal origins, religious domination, openness to sea, natural resources and political 
stability. Recent literature has employed the underlying fundamental characteristics (see 
Narayan et al., 2011; Mlachila et al., 2016; Asongu & Le Roux, 2017). Hence, in the narratives 
that follow, we articulate how environmental degradation can be associated with these 
fundamental characteristics.  
 First, from the perspective of income levels, compared to middle income countries, their 
low income counterparts are less likely to be connected with more effective mechanisms of 
managing CO2 emissions. This builds on the motivation that, developed countries have more 
resources at their disposal with which to deal with issues connected to environmental 
degradation. Moreover, given that institutions have been established to be positively connected 
to economic development, one may analogically infer that these institutions offer genuine 
mechanisms for resource and environmental management (see Fosu, 2013a, 2013b; Anyanwu 
& Erhijakpor, 2014) and the consolidation of societal change (Efobi, 2015). It is also important 
to note that low income nations are less industrialised and therefore associated with lower CO2 
emissions, which require less mechanisms of CO2 management. Moreover, these nations are 
likely to attract corporations that exploit its weak environmental regulations/legislations to set 
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up factories that employ dirty technologies, and therefore emissions may be higher than in 
higher income countries.   
  
 Hypothesis 1: Compared to low income countries, middle income countries have lower 
persistence in CO2 emissions.  
 
 Second, the relevance of legal origins in contemporary development has been 
substantially documented in the literature using African (Agbor, 2015; Asongu, 2012) and 
broader (see La Porta et al., 1998, 1999) samples. According to the consensus, compared to 
French Civil law countries, their English Common law counterparts have institutions that are 
more likely to address concerns about climate change because of political and adaptability 
mechanisms (see Beck et al., 2003). According to the adaptability mechanism, institutions in 
English common law countries are more likely to adapt to environmental challenges.  In 
essence, the institutional web of formal rules, informal norms and characteristics of 
enforcement affect the vulnerability of the population to climate change and global warming.   
 
Hypothesis 2: English Common Law countries have lower persistence in CO2 emissions 
compared to their French Civil Law counterparts.  
 
 Third, from intuition, nations that are politically-stable are more likely to create 
conditions for better environmental management compared to their counterparts that are 
politically-unstable. This intuition is in accordance with Beegle et al. (2016, p.10) who have 
argued that fragility is linked with significantly less development5. By extension, poor 
environmental management is a product of less effective economic development. Accordingly, 
rules and regulations governing environmental protection are more likely to be respected in 
politically-stable than in politically-unstable countries. In the latter set of countries, the respect 
                                                 
5
 The classification of politically-stable countries is consistent with Asongu (2014). According to the author, 
categorising a country as affected by conflict presents both practical and analytical hurdles. Hence, since few 
countries in the world are absolutely free from conflict, the distinctions are made in terms of degree of political 
strife and internal violence. Few researchers would object to the inclusion of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Chad, the Central African Republic, Somalia and Nigeria. In spite of the absence of formal features of civil 
war, Zimbabwe can be included owing to the severity of its internal strife while Liberia which has not fully 
recovered from decades of civil war and political unrest can also be considered as a conflict-affected country. 
Given the 26 year period of Angolan civil war, at least half of the sampled periodicity should reflect a conflict-
affected country, despite calm returning to the country in 2002. The Darfur crisis in Sudan which has lasted for 
more than 14 years has not officially ended. In the light of classification, aspects of seasonality in the occurrence 
of conflicts are taken into account.  
.  
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of the State and citizens of environmental-protecting institutions that govern their interactions 
between them is weak.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Politically-stable countries are linked with less persistence in CO2 emissions, 
relative to politically-unstable countries.  
 
 Fourth, contrary to the motivation on the relevance of income-levels in managing 
environmental degradation, we posit that resource-rich countries are associated with more 
characteristics of environmental degradation because they are often linked with low quality 
institutions (Mehlum et al., 2016a, 2016b). Moreover, petroleum-rich countries (e.g. Nigeria) 
are very likely to subsidize non-renewable sources of energy. The underlying motivation is 
consistent with the narrative that nations which have acknowledged scarcity in natural 
resources have focused more on achieving sustainable development (America, 2013;  Fosu, 
2013b; Amavilah, 2015). Rwanda is such an example in Africa.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Resource-poor countries are associated with lower levels of persistence in CO2 
emissions, compared to their resource-wealthy counterparts.  
 
 Fifth, with the same motivation that there are economic and institutional costs 
associated with landlockedness (see Arvis et al., 2007), it is also assumed that environmental 
costs are linked to the underlying institutional and economic costs. This is essentially because: 
(i) institutions provide more conducive conditions for the management of the environment and 
(ii) landlocked countries in Africa rely more on road traffic which intuitively could be more 
responsible for  CO2 emissions. Hence, an example of a corresponding institutional cost can be 
the additional time required to transport equipments needed to promote environmental 
sustainability. Time wasted by land transport through another neighbouring country could (in 
cases of emergency for instance), seriously affect the successful implementation of some 
environmental operations if the transportation of heavy equipments associated with the 
underlying operations cannot be transported by air transport because of financial, technical and 
logistical reasons. Moreover, given that oceans absorb CO2 emissions (Cole et al., 1993; 
Fletcher, 2017), it is reasonable to infer that countries that are open to the sea enjoy a 
comparative advantage of less persistence in CO2 emissions.  
 
 Hypothesis 5: Landlocked countries are associated with more persistence in CO2 
emissions compared to countries that are opened to the sea.   
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 In this study, religious domination is also employed as a fundamental characteristic of 
comparative sustainable development. The motivation for this distinction is that religious 
considerations build on some form of solidarity to inclusive and sustainable development (see 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b). Moreover, neoliberal societies comparatively have better 
institutions than their conservative counterparts. According to the narrative, Islam-oriented 
countries are traditionally more conservative and associated with institutions of less quality 
than their Christianity-dominated counterparts. Such underpinnings influence the choice of 
institutions and neoliberal policies for sustainable development (Roudometof, 2014).  
 
 Hypothesis 6: Christianity-dominated countries are associated with lower levels of 
persistence in CO2 emissions, compared to their Islam-oriented counterparts.   
 
3.1 Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
 This study is based on a sample of forty-four African countries with data from World 
Development Indicators and World Governance Indicators of the World Bank for the period 
2000-20126. Whereas the choice of the periodicity is motivated by constraints in data 
availability at the time of the study, the scope of the inquiry builds on the strands engaged in 
the introduction. Four main outcome variables are used, namely: CO2 emissions per capita; 
CO2 emissions from electricity and heat production; CO2 emissions from liquid fuel 
consumption and CO2 intensity.  While we cannot select all the CO2 emissions variables from 
all categories in World Bank database, the four variables are selected based on constraints in 
missing observations. Moreover, the modelling of persistence is contingent on the variables 
employed in the model. This caveat is further discussed in the concluding section.  
 Consistent with recent literature (see Asongu  & Nwachukwu, 2017a), the independent 
variable of interest with which persistence is established is the estimated lagged dependent 
variable.  Four main control variables are adopted in order to control for variable omission bias, 
namely: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, population growth, educational quality and 
regulation quality.  The choice of the control variables is consistent with recent literature on 
environmental sustainability (Asongu et al., 2018b).  
                                                 
6
 The 44 countries are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic. Republic., Congo Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia.  
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 While the first-two variables are logically expected to positively influence CO2 
emissions, the last-two should have the opposite impact. However, it is also important to 
balance the narrative by noting that when growth is not broad-based, but limited to few 
extractive industries, unexpected effects may be apparent. Furthermore, the expected impacts 
could be contingent on the weight of country-specific features that are not considered in the 
specification of the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).  The full definitions of variables, 
corresponding summary statistics and correlation matrix are disclosed in Appendix 1, Appendix 
2 and Appendix 3 respectively.  
 The motivations for the choice of the fundamental features of comparative development 
have been covered in Section 27. These fundamental characteristics have been used in recent 
comparative development literature (see Mlachila et al., 2016; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017b). 
The categorisation of countries by legal stratification is borrowed from La Porta et al. (2008, p. 
289) whereas decomposition by income levels is in accordance with the World Bank’s 
classification8.  The classification of resource-wealth is exclusively oriented by the availability 
of petroleum resources which account for about 30% of the country’s GDP for at least one 
decade of sampled periodicity. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book (CIA, 
2011) provides the classification of religious-domination whereas Landlocked versus Coastal 
nations are apparent from an Africa map. Countries that are politically-unstable represent those 
that have witnessed political violence and/or instability for at least half of the periodicity being 
investigated. Appendix 4 provides the categorisation of countries.   
 
3.2 Estimation technique  
3.2.1 Specification 
We adopt a two-step GMM for five main reasons. First, the number of countries is 
substantially more than the number of years in each cross-section.  Second, the outcome 
variables are persistent given that the coefficient of correlation between the outcome variables 
and their first lags is higher than 0.800 which is the rule of thumb for establishing persistence in 
a dependent variable. Third, since the GMM technique is in accordance with a panel data 
structure, cross-country differences are considered in the regressions. Fourth, the estimation 
approach further takes account of endogeneity by controlling for simultaneity in the exploratory 
                                                 
7
 While the motivations for the choice of fundamental features are the testable hypotheses that have been 
postulated in Section 2, in Section 3 we discuss the selection criteria for the fundamental characteristics.  
8
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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variables by means of a process of instrumentation as well as controlling for the unobserved 
heterogeneity through time-invariant variables. Fifth, inherent biases in the difference estimator 
are corrected with the system estimator. 
 Within the framework of this study, the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) extension of Arellano 
and Bover (1995) is adopted because, compared to traditional GMM techniques (systems and 
difference GMM approaches), it mitigates the proliferation of instruments (or restricts over-
identification) and controls for cross-sectional dependence (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 
2008; Boateng et al., 2018; Tchamyou, 2018). 
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiCO ,
 
is a CO2 emissions  indicator of country i
 
at  period t , 0  is a constant, 
 
W  is 
the vector of control variables (GDP growth, population growth, education and regulation 
quality),
 
 represents the coefficient of auto-regression which is one for the specification, t
 
is 
the time-specific constant,
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term.  
 
3.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions  
 
 It is relevant to engage identification properties and exclusion restrictions that are 
essential for a good GMM specification.   All explanatory indicators are acknowledged to be 
suspected endogeneous or predetermined variables and only time invariant indicators are 
considered to exhibit strict exogeneity. This process of identification is in accordance with 
recent empirical literature (see Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b). It is 
imperative to note that is not very likely for time invariant variables to be endogenous after first 
difference (see Roodman, 2009b; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017)9.   
 As concerns exclusion restrictions, given the identification process above, the years or 
variables that are time-invariant affect the outcome variable (or CO2 emissions) exclusively via 
the suspected endogenous variables. Furthermore, in order for the underlying exclusion 
restriction assumption to be valid, the null hypothesis of the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) 
                                                 
9
 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables. 
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for the exogeneity of instruments should not be accepted. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of 
the DHT is an implication that time invariant variables influence the CO2 indicators exclusively 
through the predetermined variables.  
 In the light of the above, in the findings that are reported in the empirical results section, 
the assumption of exclusion restriction is confirmed if the null hypothesis of the DHT related to 
instrumental variables (IV) (year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. This process of assessing the validity 
of exclusion restriction is not different from the standard IV procedure where-by, the failure to 
reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication 
that strictly exogenous variables affect CO2  emissions exclusively  via the suspected 
endogenous variable mechanisms (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c). 
 
 
4. Empirical results  
Table 1, Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 respectively present results corresponding to CO2 
emissions per capita, CO2 emissions from electricity and heat production,  CO2 emissions from 
liquid fuel consumption and  CO2 intensity.   The basis for assessing persistence is established 
with the estimated lagged dependent variable. A higher magnitude of this estimated coefficient 
translates a higher degree of persistence because past values of the outcome variable have a 
more proportionate impact of future values.  It is also important to note that for persistence to 
be established, the estimated lagged dependent variable should be within the convergence 
range.  
 The convergence criterion is that the absolute value of the lagged estimated endogenous 
variable should be within the interval of zero and one. The interested reader can find more 
information on this criterion in recent catch-up literature (see Fung, 2009, p. 58; Asongu, 2013, 
p. 192). Accordingly, in the standard GMM approach, the estimated coefficient can be reported 
and one subtracted from it to obtain β (β= a-1). Within this alternative framework, the 
information criterion for catch-up is established if  <0.  Otherwise, the estimated lagged 
dependent  variable could also be reported and the alternative criterion (‘0< lagged value <1’) 
used to assess catch-up (see Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 
2012b, p. 23).  
We have clarified the concepts and criteria for persistence and convergence. However, a 
precondition for these to be established is the validity of overall estimated models. Four 
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principal information criteria are used to investigate if the GMM models are valid10.  In 
addition to the information criteria, it is important to note that the second-order Arellano and 
Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) is more relevant as information criterion than the first-order. 
This is essentially because some studies have exclusively reported the higher order with no 
disclosure of the first order (e.g. see Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d). 
Based on these information criteria, for overall validity of estimated models, the models are 
overwhelmingly valid. In Tables 1-4, estimates are omitted for some fundamental 
characteristics because of issues in degree of freedom. Hence, in scenarios where the two sub-
panels within a fundamental characteristic cannot be estimated, the corresponding hypothesis 
cannot be tested. This exception applies to: (i) resources in Table 1; (ii) resources, religious-
domination and landlockedness in Table 2; (iii) resources and political stability in Table 3 and 
(iv) resources, income levels, landlockedness and political stability in Table 4. It is apparent 
after cross-examining the tables that Hypothesis 4 on resource-wealth cannot be feasibly 
examined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in 
most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results 
from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, 
p.200).  
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Table 1: Environmental Unsustainability with CO2 emissions per capita 
             
 Dependent variable: CO2 emission per capita 
             
 Income Levels Legal Origins Resources Religion Openness to Sea Political Stability 
 L.I M.I Eng. Frch. Oil-
rich 
Oil-
poor 
Christi Islam Land 
locked 
Unland 
locked 
Stable Unstable 
             
Constant  0.146** -0.668 -0.227 0.968*** na 0.626*** 0.144*** 0.561 -1.868 0.766*** 0.616*** omitted 
 (0.034) (0.775) (0.449) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.009) (0.319) (0.346) (0.000) (0.000)  
CO2  per capita (-1) 0.971*** 1.255*** 0.966*** 0.810***  0.870*** 0.904*** 0.935*** 0.955*** 0.860*** 0.863*** 0.900*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
GDP growth  -0.0004 -0.044 0.002 -0.005**  -0.001 0.002** -0.039 -0.006 -0.010*** -0.004 -0.010 
 (0.548) (0.389) (0.668) (0.049)  (0.548) (0.018) (0.328) (0.441) (0.005) (0.121) (0.505) 
Population growth  0.001 0.308 0.017 -0.250***  -
0.106*** 
-0.009 0.162 0.158 -0.187*** -0.105*** 0.029 
 (0.950) (0.461) (0.623) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.219) (0.525) (0.356) (0.000) (0.000) (0.900) 
Education  -0.001 0.012 0.004 -0.005**  -0.003** -0.0009 -0.010 0.031 -0.003** -0.005** 0.006 
 (0.153) (0.701) (0.407) (0.047)  (0.020) (0.225) (0.607) (0.352) (0.019) (0.023) (0.753) 
Regulation Quality  0.083** -0.411 -0.026 -0.122  0.201** 0.086*** -0.129 0.217 -0.005 0.049 omitted 
 (0.011) (0.622) (0.821) (0.365)  (0.021) (0.003) (0.795) (0.436) (0.893) (0.555)  
             
AR(1) (0.211) (0.282) (0.298) (0.247)  (0.128) (0.033) (0.306) (0.303) (0.117) (0.223) (0.432) 
AR(2) (0.330) (0.905) (0.185) (0.311)  (0.195) (0.230) (0.547) (0.094) (0.178) (0.302) (0.182) 
Sargan OIR (0.013) (0.005) (0.198) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.280) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (1.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.830) (1.000) (1.000) (0.675)  (0.885) (0.282) (1.000) (1.000) (0.658) (0.648) (1.000) 
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.267) (1.000) (0.721) (0.678)  (0.550) (0.155) (1.000) (1.000) (0.249) (0.796) (1.000) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.964) (1.000) (1.000) (0.543)  (0.892) (0.459) (1.000) (1.000) (0.831) (0.448) (1.000) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.687) (1.000) (0.877) (0.216)  (0.869) (0.310) (1.000) (1.000) (0.498) (0.746) (1.000) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.747) (1.000) (1.000) (0.880)  (0.733) (0.301) (1.000) (1.000) (0.630) (0.474) (1.000) 
             
Fisher  62979*** 550*** 2571*** 6054***  3608*** 14706*** 1941*** 9972*** 11443*** 6199*** 11732*** 
Instruments  28 28 28 28  28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Countries  29 15 17 27  37 30 14 14 30 34 10 
Observations  227 115 139 203  286 231 111 112 230 166 76 
             
LI: Low Income countries. MI: Middle Income countries. Eng: English Common law countries. Frch: French Civil law countries. Oil-rich: Oil 
exporting countries. Oil-poor: Nonoil exporting countries. Christ: Christian-dominated countries. Islam: Islam-dominated countries. 
Landlocked: Landlocked countries. Unlandlocked: Unlandlocked countries. Stable: Politically stable countries. Unstable: Politically unstable 
countries. *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
 
 
 
The following can be established for the remaining five hypotheses. (i) Hypothesis 1 
postulating that middle income countries have a lower level of persistence in CO2 emissions is 
valid in Tables 1 (CO2 per capita emissions), Table 2 (CO2 emissions from electricity and heat 
production) and Table 3 (CO2 emissions from liquid fuel consumption). (ii) Hypothesis 2 on the 
edge of French civil law countries is valid in Table 3 (CO2 emissions from liquid fuel 
consumption) and Table 4 (CO2 intensity), but not in Table 1 (CO2 per capita emissions). (iii) 
Hypothesis 3 on the postulation that politically-unstable countries reflect more persistence is 
valid in Table 1 (CO2 per capita emissions). (iv) Hypothesis 5 on the propensity for landlocked 
countries to be associated with more persistence in CO2 emissions is valid in Table 1 (CO2 per 
capita emissions) but not in Table 3 (CO2 emissions from liquid fuel consumption). (v) 
Hypothesis 6 maintaining that Christianity-dominated countries are more environmentally 
friendly with regard to CO2 emissions is valid in Table 1 (CO2 per capita emissions) but not in 
Tables 3-4 (CO2 emissions from liquid fuel consumption and CO2 intensity).   
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Table 2: Environmental Unsustainability CO2 emissions from electricity and heat 
production 
             
 Dependent variable: CO2 emissions from electricity and heat production 
             
 Income Levels Legal Origins Resources Religion Openness to Sea Political Stability 
 L.I M.I Eng. Frch. Oil-
rich 
Oil-poor Christi Islam Land 
locked 
Unland 
locked 
Stable Unstable 
             
Constant  -11.209 omitted omitted 3.473 na 7.095 3.101 na na -7.242 -7.519 na 
 (0.457)   (0.768)  (0.637) (0.745)   (0.557) (0.627)  
CO2  emissions (-1) 0.985*** 1.130*** 1.132*** 1.008***  0.892*** 1.079***   1.033*** 1.018***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)  
GDP growth  0.434 -0.150 0.144 0.067  0.259 0.212   0.129 0.032  
 (0.227) (0.579) (0.522) (0.503)  (0.255) (0.436)   (0.311) (0.869)  
Population growth  -2.287 -3.122 -0.576 2.430  -0.441 -1.127   -0.278 0.630  
 (0.288) (0.768) (0.861) (0.764)  (0.886) (0.607)   (0.959) (0.755)  
Education  0.282 0.112 -0.135 -0.156  0.010 -0.034   0.057 0.028  
 (0.322) (0.827) (0.309) (0.327)  (0.971) (0.860)   (0.665) (0.901)  
Regulation Quality  omitted omitted -3.791 -1.438  11.175 -0.248   -6.119 -1.925  
   (0.499) (0.789)  (0.327) (0.955)   (0.191) (0.850)  
             
AR(1) (0.082) (0.499) (0.192) (0.240)  (0.103) (0.240)   (0.003) (0.109)  
AR(2) (0.147) (0.386) (0.348) (0.662)  (0.154) (0.462)   (0.265) (0.125)  
Sargan OIR (0.985) (0.322) (1.000) (0.885)  (0.919) (0.968)   (0.950) (0.981)  
Hansen OIR (1.000) (1.000) (0.763) (1.000)  (1.000) (1.000)   (1.000) (1.000)  
             
DHT for 
instruments 
            
(a)Instruments in 
levels 
            
H excluding group (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)  (0.103) (0.943)   (0.772) (0.844)  
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)  (0.154) (1.000)   (1.000) (1.000)  
(b) IV (years, 
eq(diff)) 
            
H excluding group (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)  (0.919) (1.000)   (0.358) (0.834)  
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)  (1.000) (1.000)   (1.000) (1.000)  
             
Fisher  177.20*** 1666*** 284*** 8908***  107.10*** 47844***   345.50*** 52.89***  
Instruments  28 28 28 28  28 28   28 28  
Countries  14 8 8 14  18 16   18 17  
Observations  106 63 69 100  142 120   144 139  
             
LI: Low Income countries. MI: Middle Income countries. Eng: English Common law countries. Frch: French Civil law countries. Oil-rich: Oil 
exporting countries. Oil-poor: Nonoil exporting countries. Christ: Christian-dominated countries. Islam: Islam-dominated countries. 
Landlocked: Landlocked countries. Unlandlocked: Unlandlocked countries. Stable: Politically stable countries. Unstable: Politically unstable 
countries. *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
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Table 3: Environmental Unsustainability with CO2 emissions from liquid fuel 
consumption 
             
 Dependent variable: CO2 emissions from liquid fuel consumption  
             
 Income Levels Legal Origins Resources Religion Openness to Sea Political Stability 
 L.I M.I Eng. Frch. Oil-
rich 
Oil-poor Christi Islam Land 
locked 
Unland 
locked 
Stable Unstable 
             
Constant  0.494 -121.84 -1.140 7.817*** na 0.856 1.476 omitted 197.928* 0.447 0.011 n.a 
 (0.848) (0.326) (0.861) (0.006)  (0.809) (0.622)  (0.068) (0.871) (0.998)  
CO2  emissions  (-1) 0.873*** 2.249 1.125*** 0.902***  0.964*** 0.907*** 1.430** -2.658 0.970*** 0.956***  
 (0.000) (0.100) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.158) (0.000) (0.000)  
GDP growth  -0.115*** -0.189 -0.381* -0.014  -0.024 -0.034 2.813 -1.743** -0.028 -0.019  
 (0.004) (0.222) (0.073) (0.558)  (0.661) (0.477) (0.505) (0.040) (0.556) (0.716)  
Population growth  3.223*** 7.800 1.284 0.337  0.892** 0.843 -4.907 17.049** 0.393* 0.439**  
 (0.000) (0.294) (0.286) (0.149)  (0.013) (0.140) (0.541) (0.031) (0.070) (0.048)  
Education  0.020 0.734 -0.054 0.019  0.032 0.112*** -0.785 1.501** 0.010 0.054  
 (0.519) (0.286) (0.839) (0.297)  (0.428) (0.002) (0.450) (0.045) (0.731) (0.172)  
Regulation Quality  -1.125 13.870 2.169 1.715  1.662 0.866 -36.182 0.648 1.639* 0.060  
 (0.460) (0.528) (0.784) (0.248)  (0.323) (0.543) (0.435) (0.833) (0.095) (0.972)  
             
AR(1) (0.012) (0.656) (0.133) (0.051)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.548) (0.207) (0.010) (0.006)  
AR(2) (0.049) (0.984) (0.218) (0.192)  (0.027) (0.029) (0.590) (0.165) (0.032) (0.034)  
Sargan OIR (0.925) (0.306) (0.968) (0.898)  (0.694) (0.864) (0.122) (0.317) (0.949) (0.753)  
Hansen OIR (0.822) (1.000) (0.997) (0.743)  (0.771) (0.890) (1.000) (1.000) (0.882) (0.305)  
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in 
levels 
            
H excluding group (0.369) (1.000) (0.785) (0.608)  (0.640) (0.879) (1.000) (1.000) (0.410) (0.551)  
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.909) (1.000) (0.997) (0.670)  (0.689) (0.736) (1.000) (1.000) (0.947) (0.213)  
(b) IV (years, 
eq(diff)) 
            
H excluding group (0.922) (1.000) (0.918) (0.931)  (0.641) (0.464) (1.000) (1.000) (0.837) (0.163)  
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.596) (1.000) (0.985) (0.481)  (0.688) (0.933) (1.000) (1.000) (0.747) (0.483)  
             
Fisher  714.16*** 45.32*** 192.11*** 412.22***  270.10*** 1324*** 481468*** 137.26*** 1129*** 197.08***  
Instruments  28 28 28 28  28 28 28 28 28 28  
Countries  29 15 17 27  37 30 14 14 30 34  
Observations  227 115 139 203  286 231 11 112 230 266  
             
LI: Low Income countries. MI: Middle Income countries. Eng: English Common law countries. Frch: French Civil law countries. Oil-rich: Oil 
exporting countries. Oil-poor: Nonoil exporting countries. Christ: Christian-dominated countries. Islam: Islam-dominated countries. 
Landlocked: Landlocked countries. Unlandlocked: Unlandlocked countries. Stable: Politically stable countries. Unstable: Politically unstable 
countries. *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
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Table 4: Environmental Unsustainability with CO2 intensity (kg of oil equivalent energy 
use) 
             
 Dependent variable: CO2 intensity 
             
 Income Levels Legal Origins Resources Religion Openness to Sea Political Stability 
 L.I M.I Eng. Frch. Oil-
rich 
Oil-poor Christi Islam Land 
locked 
Unland 
locked 
Stable Unstable 
             
Constant  0.530 na omitted 0.276  0.117 0.097 omitted na -0.151 0.416 na 
 (0.899)   (0.535)  (0.893) (0.924)   (0.900) (0.644)  
CO2  emissions  (-1) 0.926***  0.123 0.900***  0.978*** 0.975*** 1.186***  0.975*** 0.974***  
 (0.001)  (0.890) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
GDP growth  0.017  0.369 0.006  0.002 -0.005 -0.004  -0.005 -0.001  
 (0.849)  (0.352) (0.519)  (0.909) (0.862) (0.658)  (0.866) (0.909)  
Population growth  -0.231  -6.323 -0.144**  0.034 -0.171 -0.945  -0.062 -0.196  
 (0.902)  (0.378) (0.035)  (0.976) (0.790) (0.284)  (0.934) (0.707)  
Education  -0.003  0.370 0.002  -0.004 0.009 0.032  0.011 0.003  
 (0.941)  (0.372) (0.617)  (0.945) (0.748) (0.300)  (0.738) (0.899)  
Regulation Quality  -0.442  9.421 -0.111  0.119 -0.044 -1.140  0.145 0.142  
 (0.850)  (0.353) (0.504)  (0.892) (0.953) (0.312)  (0.838) (0.830)  
             
AR(1) (0.822)  (0.246) (0.106)  (0.593) (0.844) (0.280)  (0.453) (0.331)  
AR(2) (0.823)  (0.289) (0.410)  (0.971) (0.897) (0.762)  (0.844) (0.550)  
Sargan OIR (0.000)  (0.000) (0.364)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.223)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Hansen OIR (1.000)  (1.000) (0.993)  (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)  (1.000) (1.000)  
             
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in 
levels 
            
H excluding group (0.990)  (1.000) (0.544)  (0.966) (0.977) (1.000)  (0.999) (0.993)  
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(1.000)  (1.000) (1.000)  (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)  (0.996) (0.997)  
(b) IV (years, 
eq(diff)) 
            
H excluding group (0.872)  (1.000) (0.060)  (0.880) (0.881) (1.000)  (0.878) (0.873)  
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(1.000)  (1.000) (1.000)  (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)  (1.000) (1.000)  
             
Fisher  69.46***  161.99*** 246.46***  30174*** 82521*** 862582***  12474*** 18901***  
Instruments  28  28 28  28 28 28  28 28  
Countries  19  10 21  26 21 10  25 26  
Observations  115  74 115  159 133 56  159 159  
             
LI: Low Income countries. MI: Middle Income countries. Eng: English Common law countries. Frch: French Civil law countries. Oil-rich: Oil 
exporting countries. Oil-poor: Nonoil exporting countries. Christ: Christian-dominated countries. Islam: Islam-dominated countries. 
Landlocked: Landlocked countries. Unlandlocked: Unlandlocked countries. Stable: Politically stable countries. Unstable: Politically unstable 
countries. *,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
 
 
 
 
5. Concluding implications, caveats and future research directions  
 
 Motivated by sustainable development challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study has 
assessed the comparative persistence in environmental unsustainability in a sample of  44 
countries in the sub-region for the period  2000 to 2012. The empirical evidence is based on 
Generalised Method of Moments. The dataset is decomposed into fundamental characteristics 
of environmental degradation based on income levels (low income versus (vs.) middle income 
countries); legal origins (English Common law vs. French Civil law countries); religious 
domination (Christianity- vs. Islam-dominated countries); openness to sea (landlocked vs. 
coastal countries); resource-wealth (oil-rich vs. oil-poor countries) and political stability (stable 
vs. unstable countries).  
Of the six hypotheses tested, it is not feasible to assess the hypothesis on resource-
wealth because of issues in degrees of freedom. As for the remaining hypotheses, the following 
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findings have been established. (i) Hypothesis 1 postulating that middle income countries have 
a lower level of persistence in CO2 emissions is valid for CO2 per capita emissions, CO2 
emissions from electricity and heat production and CO2 emissions from liquid fuel 
consumption. (ii) Hypothesis 2 on the edge of French Civil law countries is valid  for CO2 
emissions from liquid fuel consumption and CO2 intensity, but not for CO2 per capita 
emissions. (iii) Hypothesis 3 on the postulation that politically-unstable countries reflect more 
persistence is valid for CO2 per capita emissions. (iv) Hypothesis 5 on the propensity for 
landlocked countries to be associated with more persistence in CO2 emissions is valid for CO2 
per capita emissions but not for CO2 emissions from liquid fuel consumption. (v) Hypothesis 6 
maintaining that Christian-dominated countries are more environmentally friendly with regard 
to CO2 emissions is valid for CO2 per capita emissions but not for  CO2 emissions from liquid 
fuel consumption  and CO2 intensity. Before discussing policy and theoretical implications, we 
clarify Hypothesis 6 for which corresponding findings on its invalidity outweigh results for its 
validity.   
We have postulated that since Christianity-dominated countries are more open to the 
neoliberal culture, it is more likely that they have better institutions that manage the 
environment more sustainably than their Islam-oriented counterparts. Unfortunately, this 
hypothesis has been rejected by a substantial margin (two of the three CO2 emissions 
variables). Upon more intuition, what we have overlooked in the establishment of the testable 
hypotheses is the fact that nations which are more liberal are also more likely to adopt 
capitalistic tendencies that are not friendly to sustainable development (Roudometof, 2014).  
This interpretation and clarification are broadly consistent with Obeng-Odoom (2015). The 
author, in a critique of the ‘Africa  rising’ narrative has argued that  neoliberal policies imposed 
on Africa are more focused on increasing the relevance of capital accumulation, with less 
concern  on more fundamental ethnical issues like environmental degradation and inequality. 
Moreover, liberal economies are generally more opened and there is an established relationship 
between openness and the carbon footprint of countries (Peters & Hertwich, 2008;  Hertwich & 
Peters, 2009).  
 The main policy implication is that, contingent on comparative persistence in CO2 
emissions, more resources can be devoted to addressing the policy syndrome within a 
fundamental characteristic. It is important to note that persistence in a negative aspect of 
environmental quality represents a policy syndrome. Such persistence implies that past CO2 
emissions positively affect future CO2 emissions. Furthermore, more persistence in one sub-
panel compared to another within the same fundamental characteristic implies that past CO2 
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emissions have a more proportionate impact on future CO2 emissions in the sub-panel 
exhibiting more persistence.  
 The theoretical contribution of this study builds on the established persistence in 
negative economic signals. By deviating from mainstream convergence literature which is 
based on catch-up in per capita income (or positive economic signals), we have shown in this 
study that the theoretical underpinnings of the convergence literature can be extended to 
negative signals. This theoretical extension is consistent with a recent stream of literature on 
policy harmonization based on catch-up in policy syndromes, namely: the prediction of the 
Arab Spring based on negative governance and macroeconomic signals (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016d) and the fight against capital flight (Asongu, 2014). Therefore, these 
findings should also be viewed through the lens of a theory-building exercise because applied 
econometrics should not be exclusively based on the acceptance or rejection of existing 
theoretical underpinnings. Accordingly, the underpinnings of an existing theory can be 
employed in other development fields.  In essence, we have built on the theoretical 
underpinnings of income convergence literature (Barro, 1991; Barro  &  Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 
1995;  Mankiw et al., 1992;  Baumol, 1986) to assess persistence in environmental degradation. 
This improves recent theoretical literature on the need to extend the theoretical underpinnings 
of income convergence to other development fields, notably: financial market development 
(Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012) and inclusive human development (Mayer-Foulkes, 
2010; Asongu  & Nwachukwu, 2017a). Moreover, the attendant literature has fundamentally 
been based on positive macroeconomic signals. In this study, the variables used on 
environmental degradation are negative macroeconomic signals because the persistence in 
negative macroeconomic signals may even require more policy intervention, compared to the 
persistence of positive macroeconomic signals.  
 Two main caveats are worth discussing, notably: the contingency of the analysis on the 
choice of variables employed and assumptions underlying the testable hypotheses. The points 
are expanded chronological order. First, as highlighted in the data section, it is impossible to 
use all the CO2 emission variables from the World Bank Development database. Hence, we 
have been limited to a selected few based on constraints in missing observations in the other 
variables. It follows that the established evidence of persistence is contingent on the outcome 
variables as well as the variables used in the conditioning information set. This contingency of 
results in the variables employed in the model is a fundamental shortcoming of conditional (or 
contingent) convergence and/or persistence modelling by means of the Generalised of the 
Method of Moments.  
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Second, some of the motivations underpinnings the postulated hypotheses may be 
problematic. For instance, critics of the assumption underpinning the legal origin hypothesis 
maintain that the strength of British Common law vis-à-vis French Civil law may not hold for a 
plethora of reasons (Deakin & Siems 2010; Fowowe, 2014; Asongu, 2015). (i) It is doubted in 
some scholarly circles whether the distinction between Civil law and Common law is justifiable 
from a historical standpoint. (ii) With internationalization in the contemporary era, the 
distinction between Civil law and Common law is less persuasive. (iii)  The categorization of 
countries in terms of Civil law and Common law does not take into account the following 
factors, inter alia: modifications and mixtures at the moment foreign laws were copied by 
former colonies, the influence of transplant law and the post-transplant period during which the 
law transplanted could still be altered or applied differently. Notwithstanding these caveats, we 
do not expect the hypotheses to be 100% accurate, which is the reason an empirical exercise is 
needed to either validate or reject them. 
Future research can improve the extant literature by investigating whether the 
established linkages withstand empirical scrutiny when other regions of the world are 
investigated.  It would also be interesting to assess the probability of occurrence of established 
patterns in the future with alternative estimation techniques.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurement) Sources 
    
CO2 per capita CO2mtpc CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
CO2 from electricity 
and heat 
CO2elehepro CO2 emissions from electricity and heat production, total 
(% of total fuel combustion)   
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
CO2 from liquid 
fuel 
CO2lfcon CO2 emissions from liquid fuel consumption (% of total) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
    
CO2 intensity  CO2inten CO2 intensity (kg per kg of oil equivalent energy use)   World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Educational Quality Educ Pupil teacher ratio in Primary Education  World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
Population growth  Popg Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
 
Regulation Quality   
 
RQ 
“Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development”  
 
World Bank 
(WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.   
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2000-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
CO2 per capita 0.901 1.820 0.016 10.093 567 
CO2 from electricity and heat 23.730 18.870 0.000 71.829 286 
CO2 from liquid fuel 78.880 23.092 0.000 100 567 
CO2 intensity 2.044 6.449 0.058 77.586 321 
Educational Quality  43.784 14.731 12.466 100.236 425 
GDP growth  4.851 5.000 -32.832 33.735 567 
Population growth  2.334 0.866 -1.081 6.576 529 
Regulation Quality   -0.607 0.544 -2.238 0.983 530 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 155  ) 
         
         
CO2mtpc CO2elehepro CO2lfcon CO2inten Educ GDPg Popg RQ  
1.000 0.690 -0.721 0.805 -0.369 -0.057 -0.611 0.593 CO2mtpc 
 1.000 -0.695 0.703 -0.502 -0.052 -0.524 0.505 CO2elehepro 
  1.000 -0.551 0.246 0.020 0.364 -0.366 CO2lfcon 
   1.000 -0.509 -0.055 -0.698 0.676 CO2inten 
    1.000 0.104 0.515 -0.515 Educ 
     1.000 0.074 -0.140 GDPg 
      1.000 -0.624 Popg 
       1.000 RQ 
         
CO2mtpc: CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita). CO2elehepro: CO2 emissions from electricity and heat production, total  
(% of total fuel combustion). CO2lfcon: CO2 emissions from liquid fuel consumption (% of total). CO2inten: CO2 intensity  
(kg per kg of oil equivalent energy use). Educ: Quality of primary education. GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth.  
RQ: Regulation Quality.  
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Appendix 4: Categorization of Countries 
Categories  Panels Countries Num 
 
 
Income 
levels 
   
Middle 
Income  
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, , 
Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.  
   21 
   
 
Low Income  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
30 
    
 
Legal 
Origins  
English 
Common-law 
Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
    19 
   
 
French Civil-
law  
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
32 
    
    
 
Religion  
Christianity  Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, 
South Africa, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
31 
 
   
Islam  Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Libya , Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia,  
20 
    
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Libya, Nigeria, Sudan.  
10 
   
 
Non-
Petroleum 
Exporting  
 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
41 
    
 
Stability  
Conflict  Angola, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe.  
  12 
   
 
 
Non-Conflict  
Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,  Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros,  
Congo Republic, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Libya,  Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, 
Senegal, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia. 
 
39 
    
 
Openness to 
Sea 
Landlocked  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
15 
   
 
Not 
landlocked 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, 
Eritrea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, 
Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,  Seychelles, South Africa, Togo, 
Tunisia. 
 
36 
    
Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
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